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We are grateful for the continued investigation and inquiry into a topic, that we believe is not 
only important but also highly relevant in today’s world: to what extent do reminders of moral 
standards curb transgressions. We are interested to learn anything possible about the phenomena: 
replicability, boundary conditions and possible interactions, among them. What better way than 
to attempt to replicate one of our experiments across several labs and countries. As we do not yet 
know the outcome of the replication attempt, we thought it instructive to describe some of the 
challenges involved in setting up the current replication attempt of such magnitude and breadth, 
and outline important theoretical and practical considerations to designing experiments in this 
context.  
 
The goal of the current replication effort is to directly replicate one of the six experiments in the 
original paper. When we began working with the replication editors on the protocol for the direct 
replication, though, we realized there were more challenges than one would think. Our original 
experiment was run with students, not in a lab but in a large classroom, in one session, as part of 
a course requirement, in a particular location and at a particular time, as part of a packet that 
included other studies that we don’t have a record of, and set in a particular culture and country. 
As we do not know whether and how such factors contributed to our results, we tend towards 
conceptual replications. In addition, this realization suggests that it may be useful for papers to 
report many more details around their procedure than is required for publication purposes, such 
that subsequent replication attempts could come closer to reproducing meaningful contextual 
factors. 
 
Our hope was that we could achieve a broad conceptual replication attempt (Lynch et al., 2015), 
which would enable greater learning through both replication and new knowledge creation. 
Welsh and Ordonez (2014), for example, use a subconscious priming task (e.g., sentence 
unscrambling) to obtain the same effect as asking people to recall the Ten Commandments – to 
activate their moral standards, and thus conceptually replicate our results, while at the same time 
broadening the range of potential applications of the theory. Expanding on idea, since our theory 
relates the levels of dishonesty to the accessibility of moral standards, any manipulation that 
increases accessibility to said standards, coupled with any measure of dishonesty would provide 
a conceptual replication. Unfortunately, the rules for this grand replication attempt were stricter 
and did not allow for that, at least within each individual replication attempt.  
 
We believe that direct replication attempts in the context of moral and honest behavior, while 
useful to assess “statistical conclusion validity” (Lynch et al., 2015, p. 1), bear inherent 
challenges. We can divide these challenges into ones that may inhibit the effectiveness of the 
manipulation, and ones that may inhibit the instances of dishonesty – the basic effect moderated 
by the manipulation. In what follows, we outline such factors that may make it difficult to 
observe results across different contexts. First, the particular manipulation we had used to 
increase accessibility to moral standards, recalling the Ten Commandments, may not carry the 
same moral association in every culture or population (for example, we learned from the 
replication editors that in piloting our manipulation in some of the countries people needed an 
additional prompt “in the Bible” to know exactly what was meant by the Ten Commandments. 
Even if this clarification was needed purely for precision, as there may be different terms used to 
describe commandments, or there may be other commandments in other books, we would still 
expect such knowledge to moderate the effect). Indeed, we expect this particular manipulation to 
be moderated by religiosity or theological knowledge. Second, we expect the culture of the 
specific lab in which the replication is conducted to impact results as past lab practices have been 
shown to affect future participants’ affective, cognitive, and behavioral responses in subsequent 
lab sessions Ortmann & Hertwig 2002). In particular, factors such as informing participants after 
the fact that unbeknownst to them they were actually being monitored, the use of camera 
equipment for monitoring and having cameras mounted on the walls, or previous dishonesty 
studies later debriefed could all affect both the baseline degree of dishonesty, and accessibility to 
moral standards. Third, some labs have participants who might have interacted with such stimuli 
or measures in the past. Fourth, the growth of research in this field and the success of related lay 
audience books and web presentations have increased the number of participants aware that their 
degree of honesty is studied in labs, as is apparent in many post experiment debriefing sessions 
and comments. Fifth, the session we had originally used to run our experiment was relatively 
large, which we suspect afforded a semblance of anonymity. Smaller sessions may decrease the 
instance of dishonesty to such levels where it would be hard to detect any decrease caused by 
increased accessibility to moral standards. The current replication protocol called for at least 50 
participants, but it is hard to know whether that is sufficient. Finally, even factors such as the 
other studies in the package that preceded our manipulation or the time of day at which the 
studies are run may impact the degree of dishonesty, as for example, participants who are more 
tired and depleted may find it harder to uphold their moral character (Mead et al., 2009).  
 
As the replication editors similarly expected that there could be different outcomes when testing 
in other cultures (Van Bavel, Mende-Siedlecki, Brady, & Reinero, 2016), we very much support 
the RRR’s examination of the heterogeneity of the outcomes across laboratories, including 
measures of religiosity, or any other systematic variation captured by the meta-analysis. For 
example, degree of religiosity can be measured on a scale, as a number or concentration of 
religious institutions per capita, as annual sales of the bible, etc; average propensity to be 
dishonest can be proxied via a corruption index (e.g., CPI by Transparency International), the 
average crime rate, and others. We hope this helps shed some light on the complexity and factors 
relevant to research on dishonesty, as well as to direct replication attempts. We are humbled and 
thankful for the great effort of all those involved in this large scale project, and hope to continue 
learning from the results. 
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